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Introduction 
 
The United States economy boomed in the late 1990s.  The national 
unemployment rate fell to under four percent for the first time since January 1970.  Real 
GDP growth per capita averaged 3.2 percent per year between 1995 and 2000, relative to 
an annual growth rate of 1.9 percent between 1973 and 1990 and 1.3 percent between 
1990 and 1995.1   
 
The evidence from the 1990s also supports President Kennedy’s famous statement 
that “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  The poverty rate of Hispanics reached an all-time low, 
while the income of the median Hispanic family rose to a record high.   
 
But the economy began to downshift to a slower pace of economic growth in the 
second half of 2000 and continued to downshift throughout 2001.  For example, in the 
second quarter of 2001, real GDP growth was only 0.3 percent (at an annual rate), 
compared to 5.7 percent in the second quarter of 2000.   
 
The terrorist attacks on September 11th accelerated the economic slowdown.  
They clearly caused severe short-term economic disruptions, especially in New York 
City.  In addition, the terrorist attacks have created a particularly difficult challenge for 
the travel and tourism industry, have interrupted some economically beneficial business 
activities that require face-to-face meetings or expedited shipping, and have shaken 
consumer confidence.  As a result, most forecasters now predict that the negative growth 
recorded for the third quarter of 2002 will be continued into the fourth quarter.2   
 
To be sure, it is difficult to forecast the future course of the U.S. economy.  
Indeed, several factors suggest a somewhat auspicious outlook.  First, the long-term 
prospects of the U.S. economy remain sound.3  Second, the Federal Reserve has cut 
                                                 
1 Based on data from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
2 A special survey of 50 top economic forecasters by Blue Chip Economic Indicators found that the 
consensus estimate for real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of this year was negative 0.7 percent.   
3  As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated in Congressional testimony on September 20th, “as 
we struggle to make sense of our profound loss and its immediate consequences for the economy, we must 
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short-term interest rates 11 times since January 2001, and by some measures, short-term 
interest rates are now negative in inflation-adjusted terms.  Lower short-term interest 
rates should have a beneficial impact on business investment.  Third, energy prices have 
fallen significantly, with the average price of unleaded gasoline dropping from $1.73 per 
gallon in May 2001 to $1.43 in August 2001, and even lower as of this writing.4  Finally, 
the Federal government is providing a substantial fiscal stimulus.  The “automatic 
stabilizers” of the Federal budget (such as the reduction in tax payments and increase in 
unemployment insurance payments) will spur demand as the economy slows.  In 
addition, Congress has already approved roughly $40 billion in additional fiscal stimulus 
packages, and may approve another stimulus package in the range of $75 billion and 
$100 billion.  Nonetheless, the future course of consumer confidence remains uncertain, 
and it is clear that economic growth is far below its potential growth rate. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential impact of the current 
economic downturn on Hispanic workers and families, and analyze how prepared 
Hispanics are for the economic recession.5  The paper is divided into four sections: The 
first section briefly explores the progress made by Hispanics during the economic boom 
of the 1990s.  The second section uses the experience of Hispanics in past economic 
downturns to predict how they will fare in the current economic slowdown.  The third 
section analyzes how well prepared Hispanic workers are for the economic slowdown.  
The final section draws conclusions based on the first three sections. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
not lose sight of our longer-run prospects, which have not been significantly diminished by these terrible 
events.”  See Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
United States Senate, September 20, 2001. 
4 See Gale, Orszag, and Sperling (2001), page 256. 
5 “Hispanic” includes all workers who are of Hispanic origin.  As part of the various government surveys, 
people are asked a question regarding their origin or descent. Respondents are asked to select their origin 
(and the origin of other household members) from a “flash card” listing Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 
Central or South American, or some other Hispanic origin. It should be noted that persons of Hispanic 
origin may be of any race. 
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I. The 1990s: A Rising Tide Lifts All Boats 
 
 In February 2000, the U.S. economy reached a milestone: the economic recovery 
that officially began in March 1991 became the longest economic expansion in history.  
The length of the 1990s expansion was impressive.  But the depth and steadiness of the 
expansion were truly remarkable.   
 
Nationally, the unemployment rate fell from nearly eight percent in mid-1992 to 
less than four percent in 2000, a level most economists thought was impossible to reach 
again while maintaining low and stable inflation.  Even productivity growth, which for 
two decades had remained sluggish, increased significantly in the 1990s, at least partly 
due to massive investments in informative technology.6   
 
The exceptional macroeconomic performance of the 1990s lifted the boats of all 
segments of American society.  As the economic expansion continued, businesses 
reached deeper and deeper into the labor market to find workers, which created new 
employment opportunities for low-income workers.  One effect of such a “high-pressure” 
economy was a sharp drop in poverty.  The overall poverty rate fell from 15.3 percent in 
1993 to 11.3 percent in 2000 – its lowest level since 1974 – and the child poverty rate 
declined from 22.7 percent in 1993 to 16.2 percent in 2000.   
 
The economic prosperity had a particularly beneficial impact on Hispanics.  As 
Table 1 indicates, every major economic indicator for Hispanics moved in a positive 
direction in the 1990s.  The number of employed Hispanics rose from 10 million in 1992 
to 14.5 million in 2000.  The Hispanic unemployment rate fell from 11.6 percent in 1992 
to 5.7 percent in 2000; the Hispanic unemployment rate reached 5.0 percent in October 
2000 – its lowest level since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began to collect monthly 
statistics on Hispanics in 1973.7  In addition, the Hispanic unemployment rate fell 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Alan Greenspan, “The Revolution in Information Technology,” Speech Delivered to the 
Boston College Conference on the New Economy, March 6, 2000. 
7 The unemployment rate is measured as the number of unemployed workers as a share of the labor force.  
Thus, one shortcoming of the official unemployment rate is that it excludes workers who would like to 
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significantly in each of the eight largest states; for example, in California, the Hispanic 
unemployment rate dropped from 13.1 percent in 1992 to 6.5 percent in 2000. 
 
A couple of academic studies have shown that recent Hispanic immigrants fare 
relatively poorly in the labor market.  But as the immigrants assimilate into society, they 
perform better than native-born Hispanics.8  Interestingly, the decline in the Hispanic 
unemployment rate in the late 1990s was disproportionately concentrated among foreign-
born Hispanics.  In 1996, the unemployment rates of native-born and foreign-born 
Hispanics were roughly equal: 9.0 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively.  By 2000, the 
native-born Hispanic unemployment rate had fallen to 6.4 percent, while the foreign-born 
Hispanic unemployment rate dropped to 5.1 percent. 
 
But the Hispanic labor force is even more diverse than just foreign-born and 
native-born workers.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports data for Hispanics of 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban origin.  In 2000, among Hispanics, those from Puerto 
Rico had the highest unemployment rate (7.4 percent), while Cuban Hispanics had the 
lowest unemployment rate (4.4 percent).  Despite these differences, each of these groups 
of Hispanics experienced similar percentage declines in unemployment during the second 
half of the 1990s.  The unemployment rate of Hispanics of Mexican origin declined from 
9.7 percent in 1995 to 5.9 percent in 2000; the unemployment rate of Hispanics of Puerto 
Rican origin dropped from 11.2 percent in 1995 to 6.4 percent in 2000, and the 
unemployment rate of Cuban Hispanics fell from 7.4 percent in 1995 to 4.4 percent in 
2000.   
 
 As Hispanic unemployment dropped in the late 1990s, the Hispanic poverty rate 
also fell sharply, from 30.3 percent in 1995 to 21.2 percent in 2000.  Such a drop in the 
poverty rate means that more than 1.4 million Hispanics – including 750,000 Hispanic 
children – were lifted out of poverty between 1995 and 2000.   
                                                                                                                                                 
have a job, but have given up looking for one and have dropped out of the labor force.  The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics started to collect data on such “discouraged” workers in 1994.  The number of Hispanic 
discouraged workers declined by more than 50 percent between 1994 and 2000, falling from 70,000 in 
1994 to 34,000 in 2000. 
8 See Meisenheimer (1992) and Sehgal (1985). 
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Median family income among Hispanics also improved dramatically.  It rose from 
$27,588 in 1995 to $35,050 in 2000 (in constant 2000 dollars), a 4.9-percent real annual 
increase.  Hispanic families in every region of the country prospered (see Table 1).  In 
addition, the income gains in the late 1990s were widely shared among Hispanics: every 
income group from the richest to the poorest Hispanics saw income gains of at least 15 
percent, adjusted for inflation, and the poorest 20 percent of Hispanic families 
experienced the largest income gains (32 percent in real terms). See Figure 1.   
 
As income improved during the 1990s, the financial position of Hispanics 
strengthened.  Between 1992 and 1998, the median net worth of Hispanic families 
increased 23 percent, rising from $7,889 in 1992 to $9,720 in 1998 (in constant 1998 
dollars).  A more narrow perspective on the financial position of Hispanics is median 
financial assets, which is a measure of how much Hispanic families have stored away in 
relatively liquid assets: Median financial assets also increased substantially (albeit from 
low levels), rising from $349 in 1992 to $1,200 in 1998. 
 
Despite the economic gains achieved by Hispanics in the 1990s, two areas of 
concern are prominent.  First, Hispanics still lag behind the rest of the population along 
nearly every economic indicator.  For example, the typical weekly earnings of full-time 
Hispanic workers ($396 per week in 2000) were just 67 percent of the weekly earnings of 
full-time white workers ($591 per week in 2000).  In 2000, the white unemployment rate 
was 3.5 percent, compared to 5.7 percent among Hispanics. 
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Table 1: 
Hispanic Economic Indicators Over the Past Decade 
 Peak 
1989 
Trough 
1992 
Peak 
2000 
 
Hispanic Unemployment Rate 8.0% 11.6% 5.7% 
 
Hispanic Unemployment Rate 
For 8 Largest State 
   
California 7.6% 13.1% 6.5% 
Florida 7.4% 10.2% 4.8% 
Illinois 6.1% 10.7% 4.7% 
Michigan 13.2% 14.7% 6.6% 
New York 8.0% 14.5% 6.9% 
Ohio 10.5% 12.9% 6.3% 
Pennsylvania 7.6% 14.8% 5.4% 
Texas 10.2% 9.7% 5.0% 
 
Hispanic Employment  
(in thousands) 
        8,573        10,027        14,492  
 
Hispanic Employment-to-
Population Ratio 
62.2% 59.1% 64.7% 
 
Hispanic Poverty Rate 26.2% 29.6% 21.2% 
 
Hispanic Child Poverty Rate 36.2% 40.0% 28.0% 
 
Hispanic Median Family 
Income (in constant 2000 dollars) 
 $   31,616   $   28,421   $   35,050  
 
Hispanic Median Family 
Income by Region (in constant 
2000 dollars) 
   
Northeast  $   30,512   $   24,090   $   31,866  
Midwest  $   35,544   $   28,251   $   39,389  
South  $   27,671   $   27,255   $   35,816  
West  $   34,401   $   30,709   $   34,821  
 
Hispanic Homeownership Rate n.a. 41.2% (1994) 46.3% 
    
Hispanic Median Net Worth $6,573 $7,889 $9,720 
    
Hispanic Median Financial 
Assets 
$789 $349 $1,200 
 Source: Data on unemployment and employment are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population 
 Survey, various years.  Data on poverty, family income, and homeownership are from the Bureau of the Census.   
 Poverty and family income data are from the March Current Population Survey, various years.  Homeownership  
 data are from the Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey.  Data on net worth and financial assets  
 are from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. 
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Second, the dramatic gains among Hispanics during the 1990s may be temporary.  
It is unclear whether Hispanics will be permanently better off because of the 1990s 
economic boom or whether their gains will be completely lost in the current economic 
downturn.  Whether the gains are lost will not be known for some time, but there are 
reasons to be hopeful that Hispanics will be permanently better off because of the recent 
economic expansion.  Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger (2001) conclude that a “high-pressure 
economy makes it somewhat more likely that workers will move from dead end jobs to 
jobs with upwardly sloping seniority profiles.”9  In other words, since many Hispanics 
likely moved into “better” jobs during the good economic times, these workers are more 
likely to be in a better position to benefit from future economic gains. 
 
 
 
II. The Current Economic Downturn: How Will Hispanics Fare? 
 
 A significant body of academic research has found that labor market indicators 
are procyclical – that is, when economic growth slows, labor market indicators 
                                                 
9 Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger (2001), page 3.   
Figure 1: Real Hispanic Family 
Income Growth by Quintile,
1995-2000
32% 
28%
26%
22%
15%
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
Bottom 20 
Percent 
Second 20
Percent
Middle 20
Percent
Fourth 20
Percent
Top 20
Percent
 8
deteriorate, and vice-versa.10  The weight of the evidence also suggests that labor market 
indicators for minority groups, such as Hispanics, are more sensitive to changes in 
economic conditions.11   
 
 The purpose of this section is to use historical experience to examine how 
indicators of Hispanic well-being may fare during the current economic downturn.  It is 
important to emphasize that forecasting is an inherently difficult task: as Niels Bohr, a 
Nobel Prize winning physicist, once said, “prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s 
about the future.”  Because of the uncertainty involved in forecasting the course of 
Hispanic economic indicators, we utilize two different methodologies to develop a range 
of potential outcomes during the current economic downturn.   
 
 The first, and more rigorous, approach combines the historical relationship 
between a macroeconomic indicator (such as overall unemployment) and an Hispanic 
indicator (such as median family income) with forecasts for the macroeconomic variable 
to predict future changes in the Hispanic indicator.12  We use three different forecasts of 
overall unemployment – a central estimate, a low estimate, and a high estimate – to 
develop our range of estimates for Hispanic unemployment, overall poverty, and median 
family income.  First, we use the average estimate of unemployment of fifty economic 
forecasters, as reported by the Blue Chip Economic Indicators.13   Then we also use the 
average estimate of unemployment of the highest and lowest 10 forecasters, respectively.  
                                                 
10 See, for example, Blanchard and Katz (1992), Hoynes (2000), Blank and Blinder (1986), Blank and Card 
(1993), Cutler and Katz (1991), and Freeman (2001). 
11 See, for example, Newman (1978), Abowd and Killingsworth (1984), DeFreitas (1986), and DeFreitas 
(1991).  Reimers (2000) found that Hispanic men and women benefit “slightly more than whites (but less 
than blacks) because Hispanics, on average, have less education than their white counterparts.  But when 
industry, occupation, education, and age level are identical, Hispanic men’s unemployment are less 
sensitive to local unemployment rates than are those of white men.” See Reimers (2000), page 4.  
12 The model we use to estimate changes in the Hispanic unemployment rate is: Huet = α + βUet + ε, where 
Huet equals the Hispanic unemployment rate in time period t and Uet  equals the total unemployment rate in 
time period t.  We use a slightly different model to predict changes in Hispanic poverty: 
HPovertyDifferencet = α + βUeDifferencet + εt ,  where HPovertyDifference equals the difference in 
Hispanic poverty between time period t and time period t-1 and UeDifference equals the difference in total 
unemployment between time period t and time period t-1.  We use a similar model to forecast changes in 
Hispanic family income. 
13 According to a number of academic studies, using an average of a range of private-sector forecasts is 
advantageous: Average forecasts tend to be more accurate – that is, they have smaller errors – than 
individual forecasts.  See, for example, Schuh (2001) and Zarnowitz and Braun (1993). 
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To provide a sense of the difference in estimates, the average estimate of the 2002 
unemployment rate among these 50 forecasters is 5.6 percent, while the average of the 
highest 10 forecasters is 6.2 percent and the average of the lowest 10 forecasters is 5.1 
percent.   
 
 It is worth noting that the current Blue Chip forecasts remain relatively optimistic: 
The central forecasts suggest a strong recovery by the middle of 2002, and even the most 
pessimistic 10 forecasts suggest a robust recovery by then.  Although the Blue Chip 
forecasts are the best ones available, the uncertainty surrounding the forecasts seems 
particularly high – and it is therefore crucial to realize that to the extent the Blue Chip 
forecasts turn out to have been too optimistic, the projections from this first approach 
would be too optimistic also.   
 
 Partially to address the concern that the Blue Chip forecasts may be too 
optimistic, we also adopt a second approach, which applies changes in Hispanic 
indicators during past recessions (in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s) to the current level of 
the indicator.  That is, if the Hispanic unemployment rate rose by 14 percent over the first 
six months of the 1980s recession, then we project the Hispanic unemployment rate for 
March 2002 to be 14 percent above its level in September 2001 (or 7.3 percent compared 
to 6.4 percent in September 2001).  While this approach is not based on regression 
analysis, it does allow us to explore the impact of a recession that has similar effects to 
past recessions.    
 
 We apply these two methodologies to three major indicators of Hispanic 
economic well-being: unemployment, family income, and poverty.  We also apply these 
methodologies to more detailed subcategories of each of these indicators, such as state 
unemployment rates, median family income by region, and child poverty.   
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Hispanic Unemployment Rates 
 
 During the economic boom of the 1990s, the Hispanic unemployment rate 
reached its lowest level ever recorded.  But Hispanic unemployment has climbed 2.6 
percentage points in the past 13 months, from 5.0 percent in October 2000 to 7.6 percent 
in November 2001.   
 
 Figure 2 shows the projections of Hispanic unemployment based on a projection 
of the historical relationship between Hispanic unemployment and overall 
unemployment, using the overall unemployment forecasts in the Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators.14  Using the average forecast of quarterly overall unemployment, the Hispanic 
unemployment rate rises from 7.6 percent in November 2001 to 8.4 percent in the first 
quarter of 2002, and continues to rise to 8.5 percent in the second quarter before leveling 
out.  The Hispanic unemployment rate then begins to fall again in the fourth quarter of 
2002.   
 
 Using the estimates of unemployment of the highest and lowest 10 forecasters 
provides a range of possible results.  Under the average of the pessimistic forecasts, 
Hispanic unemployment could rise as high as 9.3 percent in the second quarter of 2002 
before falling to 9.2 percent in the fourth quarter.  Such a level would be 86 percent 
above the Hispanic unemployment rate achieved in October 2000 and would mean that 
nearly 700,000 more Hispanics were unemployed.  Under the average of the more 
optimistic forecasts, Hispanic unemployment would rise to 8.0 percent in the first quarter 
of 2002 and then would start to drop in the third and fourth quarters (reaching 7.5 percent 
by the end of 2002).   
 
                                                 
14 For predicting Hispanic unemployment rates, we use the quarterly overall unemployment rate forecasts 
from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators, which are available through the end of 2002.  For all other 
forecasts, we use annual forecasts through 2004. 
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 The second method applies percent changes in Hispanic unemployment during the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s recession to the September 2001 Hispanic unemployment rate.15  
See Figure 3.   
 
• 1970s Recession.  If the current recession were to follow the path of the recession 
from November 1973 to March 1975, the Hispanic unemployment rate would 
remain relatively steady through 2002 and then rise sharply at the beginning of 
2003.  The Hispanic unemployment rate would reach more than 10 percent in the 
spring of 2003 before declining somewhat in late 2003 and 2004.  It is important 
to note that during the expansion following the 1970s recession, the 
unemployment rate of Hispanics did not reach its pre-recession level of 8.0 
percent until February 1979.  If Hispanic unemployment were to follow that path 
during the current economic slowdown, the Hispanic unemployment rate would 
not fall below 6.4 percent until January 2007. 
 
• 1980s Recession. If the current downturn were to mimic the early 1980s 
recession, Hispanic unemployment would rise to nearly 10 percent in early 2003.  
It would then drop sharply by the end of 2003 and 2004, falling from nearly 10 
percent to 6.5 percent in the late summer of 2004.  In other words, by September 
2004, the Hispanic unemployment rate would return to its pre-recession level.  
For comparison, the unemployment rates of whites and African Americans would 
bounce back to their pre-recession levels at roughly the same time: If the white 
and African-American unemployment rates follow their same path as during the 
1980s recession, they would both fall back to their September 2001 level in 
August 2004.  
 
                                                 
15 For the purposes of mapping previous recessions onto the current unemployment rate, we assume that 
September 2001 is the start of the current recession.   
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Figure 2: Forecasts of Hispanic 
Unemployment Based on Blue Chip 
Economic Forecasts
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• 1990s Recession.  If the Hispanic unemployment rate tracks its changes during the 
1990-1991 recession, it will rise to roughly nine percent by the end of 2002, 
continue to rise to roughly 10 percent in late 2003 and early 2004, and then 
decline to under nine percent in late 2004.  During the early part of the expansion 
following the 1990s recession, Hispanic unemployment did not fall as rapidly as 
the white or African-American unemployment rates.  For example, the white and 
African-American unemployment rates returned to roughly their pre-1990s 
recession level by the beginning of 1995.  The Hispanic unemployment rate did 
not fall to its pre-1990s recession level until December 1996.  If Hispanic 
unemployment were to follow that path during the current economic slowdown, 
the Hispanic unemployment rate would not fall below 6.4 percent until March 
2008; for comparison, the white and African-American unemployment rates 
would return to roughly their pre-recession levels by early 2006. 
  
 Using both methodologies, the Hispanic unemployment rate does not rise as high 
as it reached during the 1990s recession; Hispanic unemployment peaked at 12.1 percent 
in June 1992.  In other words, since the Hispanic unemployment rate recently reached 
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record lows, increases in the unemployment rate similar to those that occurred in previous 
recessions would not raise Hispanic unemployment to the same levels it had reached in 
those previous downturns.  This result reflects one way in which the economic prosperity 
of the 1990s could have a long-term positive impact on Hispanic unemployment rates.   
 
 Note that the forecasts of Hispanic unemployment rates based on past recessions 
are higher than those based on the Blue Chip macroeconomic forecasts.  This disparity is 
not surprising, given the relatively optimistic nature of the Blue Chip forecasts (that is, 
the Blue Chip forecasts suggest that the current recession will be relatively mild and 
short-lived). 
 
Figure 3: Forecasts of Hispanic Unemployment 
Based on Past Recessions
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 Since the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating 
Committee announced on November 26, 2001 that a recession began in March 2001, 
some additional insight is offered by examining the change in unemployment rates over 
the past eight months.  Since March 2001, the Hispanic unemployment rate has increased 
1.3 percentage points, rising from 6.3 percent to 7.6 percent in November 2001.  For 
comparison, over the same time period, the white and African-American unemployment 
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rates have risen by 1.4 percentage points and 1.5 percentage points, respectively.  (Table 
2 presents the changes in Hispanic, white, and African-American unemployment rates 
during the first eight months of the early 1980s, 1990s, and the current recessions.)  Such 
similar rises suggest that Hispanics may not have fared worse so far during the current 
economic slowdown.  But the comparison may be somewhat deceptive: Since October 
2000 – when the unemployment rate reached its low point – the Hispanic unemployment 
rate has risen by 2.6 percentage points, compared to a 1.7 percentage point increase for 
white unemployment and a 2.7 percentage point increase for African-American 
unemployment between October 2000 and November 2001.  In other words, the recession 
appears to have started somewhat earlier for Hispanics and African Americans than for 
white workers. 
 
Table 2: Changes in Unemployment Rates by Race During 
First Eight Months of Current and Previous Recessions 
  
Change in 
Hispanic 
unemployment 
 
Change in 
white 
unemployment 
Change in 
African-
American 
unemployment 
 
1980s 
recession 
2.2 
percentage 
points 
1.7 
percentage 
points 
3.1 
percentage 
points 
 
1990s 
recession 
1.8 
percentage 
points 
1.3 
percentage 
points 
1.1 
percentage 
points* 
 
Current 
recession 
1.3 
percentage 
points 
1.4 
percentage 
points 
1.5 
percentage 
points 
     * The month before the 1990 recession began the African-American unemployment rate 
     increased 0.9 percentage points.  Over the eight months beginning the month before the 
        1990 recession officially started, the African-American unemployment rate increased 
                    1.7 percentage points. 
 
 As noted above, first-generation Hispanics experienced a larger decline in 
unemployment during the 1990s than native-born Hispanics.  Since the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics only recently began collecting regular data on native-born and immigrant 
Hispanics, it is difficult to estimate how each group may fare in the current economic 
downturn.  If each group’s unemployment rate increases in line with the overall Hispanic 
unemployment rate and the overall Hispanic unemployment rate rises to 8.5 percent, the 
unemployment rate of first-generation Hispanics would rise from 5.1 percent in 2000 to 
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7.6 percent in the middle of 2002 and the unemployment rate of native-born Hispanics 
would increase from 6.4 percent in 2000 to 9.5 percent in the middle of 2002.  If, instead, 
the overall Hispanic unemployment rate increases to 10 percent, the immigrant Hispanic 
unemployment rate may rise to 8.9 percent, while the native-born unemployment rate 
would rise to 11.2 percent. 
 
State Unemployment 
 
 Table 3 presents data on Hispanic unemployment rates for the eight largest states, 
including forecasts of Hispanic unemployment if the current economic slowdown follows 
the paths of the 1980s and 1990s recessions in each of the states.  The Hispanic 
population is disproportionately located in the southern and western parts of the United 
States.  Indeed, roughly half of all Hispanics reside in California and Texas alone.16 
 
 It is important to caution that these data are based on relatively small sample 
sizes.  Thus, the probability that movements in a state’s Hispanic unemployment rate are 
due to statistical variation, instead of changes in the real economy, is greatly increased.  
For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that when the Michigan Hispanic 
unemployment rate was 6.6 percent in 2000, the confidence interval on that number was 
plus or minus 2.4 percentage points.  In other words, a change in the Hispanic 
unemployment rate in Michigan of less than 2.4 percentage points would be statistically 
insignificant.  Despite the small sample sizes, Table 3 provides a sense of the potential 
changes in state-level Hispanic unemployment rates during the next few years.   
 
Employment by Industry 
 
 In 2000, Hispanic workers accounted for 10.7 percent of the United States 
workforce.  As Table 4 indicates, Hispanic workers were disproportionately concentrated 
in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and retail trade.  For comparison, African-
                                                 
16 See U.S. Bureau of the Census, “The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief,” May 2001, page 4.  
Nearly 73 percent of Hispanics reside in the eight largest states; for comparison, 48 percent of the U.S. 
population lives in the eight largest states.   
 16
American workers were disproportionately employed in transportation, communications, 
and other public utilities, the service sector, and government. 
 
Table 3: 
Forecasts of Hispanic Unemployment Based on Past Recessions, By State 
  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
California   
1980s-Style Recession 7.0% 6.5% 8.8% 8.6% 6.6% 6.3% 
1990s-Style Recession 7.0 6.5 9.1 10.4 9.9 9.0 
 
 
Florida  
1980s-Style Recession 5.2 4.8 6.8 6.8 4.2 3.6 
1990s-Style Recession 5.2 4.8 5.5 6.2 5.3 5.6 
 
 
Illinois  
1980s-Style Recession 5.5 4.3 6.8 5.4 4.8 4.4 
1990s-Style Recession 5.5 4.3 6.6 7.1 5.0 4.8 
 
 
Michigan  
1980s-Style Recession 6.4 6.6 7.8 10.3 6.4 5.6 
1990s-Style Recession 6.4 6.6 6.2 7.9 5.3 4.9 
 
 
New York  
1980s-Style Recession 8.4 6.9 8.2 7.6 7.6 7.9 
1990s-Style Recession 8.4 6.9 9.7 13.2 11.9 9.5 
 
 
Ohio  
1980s-Style Recession 4.9 6.3 15.2 10.8 11.4 16.0 
1990s-Style Recession 4.9 6.3 6.1 8.8 6.1 4.3 
 
 
Pennsylvania  
1980s-Style Recession 10.7 5.4 5.1 6.6 5.0 2.3 
1990s-Style Recession 10.7 5.4 9.4 9.0 11.2 5.9 
 
 
Texas        
 1980s-Style Recession 6.2 5.0 6.7 8.0 6.1 6.7 
 1990s-Style Recession 6.2 5.0 5.1 5.6 5.3 4.9 
   Note: Numbers in italics are forecasts 
 
 The evidence from the 1990-1991 recession suggests that Hispanics work in 
industries that are more prone to layoffs than the non-Hispanic workforce.  For example, 
between 1989 and 1992, while total employment increased by over 1.1 million jobs, the 
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manufacturing and construction industries lost more than 2.1 million jobs; both industries 
have a disproportionate share of Hispanic workers.  Another perspective is offered by 
applying the overall percentage change in employment by industry from 1989 to 1992 to 
the 1989 distribution of Hispanic and non-Hispanic employment.  We calculate that if 
Hispanics had been identically distributed among industries as non-Hispanic workers, 
Hispanic job growth would have been substantially more rapid. 
 
 In the current economic downturn, industries that Hispanics are disproportionately 
concentrated appear to be suffering the most.  Hispanics account for more than one-fifth 
of the workforce in industries such as the hotel industry, agriculture, laundry services, 
and textiles.  Some of these industries have been particularly hard hit during the current 
downturn.  For example, the hotel industry was suffering from a significant drop-off in 
business travel even before September 11th.  Since September 11th, occupancy rates have 
dropped to record lows.  In Denver, the hotel occupancy rate fell to 50 percent to 55 
percent in September – the worst since the late 1980s.17  In Las Vegas – where 
immigrants comprise an estimated 50 percent of unionized hotel and restaurant workers18 
– the MGM Mirage’s properties had their lowest occupancy rate in history between 
September 11th and September 30th: 64 percent.19  Such low occupancy rates have led to 
significant layoffs; a number of big hotel chains, including MGM Mirage and Wyndham 
International, have announced layoffs in the beginning of October.20  Since Hispanics 
account for 21 percent of the 1.4 million Americans employed in the hotel and motel 
industry, they will likely feel the brunt of the layoffs in the hotel industry.   
 
Hispanic Median Family Income 
 
 As noted above, the income of the median Hispanic family skyrocketed in the late 
1990s, rising 27 percent between 1995 and 2000 (after adjusting for inflation).  For 
                                                 
17 John Rebchook, “City Occupancy Rate Sinks,” Rocky Mountain News, October 3, 2001, available at 
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/real_estate/article/0,1299,DRMN_414_837882,00.html 
18 See Friedrich (2001). 
19 “MGM Mirage Reports Third Quarter Results,” PRNewswire, October 30, 2001. 
20 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/legacy/layoff_article.htm 
 18
comparison, between 1984 and 1989, the real income of the median Hispanic family 
increased just six percent. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Employment by Industry, 2000 
  
Distribution of 
Total Workforce 
 
Distribution of 
Hispanic Workers 
Distribution of 
African-American 
Workers  
Agriculture 2.4% 5.1% 0.9% 
Mining 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 
Construction 7.0% 9.7% 4.1% 
Manufacturing 14.7% 17.0% 13.4% 
   Durable Goods 9.0% 8.5% 7.5% 
   Nondurable Goods 5.7% 8.4% 6.0% 
Transportation, Communications, 
and Other Public Utilities 7.2% 6.3% 10.0% 
Wholesale Trade 4.0% 4.5% 2.7% 
Retail Trade 16.6% 19.1% 14.8% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 6.5% 4.2% 6.0% 
Services 36.8% 31.3% 41.6% 
Government 4.4% 3.0% 6.5% 
    
Total 100.0% 10.7% 11.3% 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey. 
 
 But changes in economic conditions directly affect the income of Hispanic 
families.  An analysis of the past relationship between median family income of 
Hispanics and the overall unemployment rate suggests that for each one percentage point 
increase of overall unemployment, the real income of the typical Hispanic family falls by 
an average of $900. 
 
 Using the average Blue Chip Economic forecast for the overall unemployment 
rate, we predict that the median income of Hispanic families will fall from $35,050 in 
2000 to $33,938 in 2002 – a 3.2 percent drop.  (See Figure 4.) The average forecast 
suggests that unemployment will decline in 2003 and 2004, and as a result, Hispanic 
family income is expected to rise in those years.  But the median income among Hispanic 
families does not return to its 2000 level until sometime after 2004.   
 
 We obtain a range of forecasts of Hispanic family income by using the average 
estimate of unemployment of the highest and lowest 10 forecasters in the Blue Chip 
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sample.  Under the average of the pessimistic forecasts, real median Hispanic family 
income would fall to $33,397 in 2002 before rising to $34,448 in 2004.  Even under the 
average of the more optimistic forecasts, Hispanic family income would fall in both 2001 
and 2002 (but not by as much as under the average forecast) and would return to its 2000 
level only in 2004.   
 
Figure 4: Forecasts of Hispanic Family Income 
Based on Blue Chip Economic Forecasts
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 The movements in real median family income of Hispanics during past recessions 
may also be illustrative of what could happen during the current recession.21   During the 
1981-1982 recession, median Hispanic family income increased in the first year of the 
recession and then dropped significantly.  If the current economic downturn mimics the 
1980s recession, median Hispanic family income would rebound to its 2000 level in 
2004.  (See Figure 5.)  However, if the real income of the typical Hispanic family follows 
the path of the 1990s recession, Hispanic income will fall for the next three years before 
rising slightly in the fourth year: in 2004, real median Hispanic family income will be 
$2,441 lower than in 2000.   
 
                                                 
21 Since median family income for Hispanics is available from 1974 to the present, we are not able to use 
the 1970s recession (which began in 1973).   
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Figure 5: Forecasts of Hispanic Family 
Income Based on Past Recessions
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 In addition, following the 1990s recession, Hispanic family income did not return 
to its pre-recession level until 1999; in other words, if the current recession and 
subsequent expansion were to follow such a path, median Hispanic family income would 
not rise above its 2000 level until 2010!  For comparison, the median income of African-
American families rebounded to its 1989 level by 1994, and the median income of white 
families returned to its pre-1990 recession level by 1996.   
 
Income by Region 
 
 In the late 1990s, Hispanic families in all four major regions of the United States 
prospered.  To provide illustrative examples of what could happen to median Hispanic 
family income in the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West, we mapped the changes in 
median Hispanic family income for those regions during past recessions onto the 2000 
median family income numbers.  See Table 5.  For example, in the Northeast, median 
Hispanic family income would be between six and eight percent below its 2000 level in 
2004, if it follows a similar trend as during the past two recessions.  On the other hand, 
the Hispanic families in the West experienced very rapid income growth after the 1981-
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1982 recession: if such a pattern repeated itself, real median Hispanic family income 
would end up 4.3 percent higher in 2004 than its current level. 
 
 As with the estimates of unemployment rates by state, median family income by 
region are based on smaller sample sizes than the aggregate numbers.  Thus, they are 
subject to more statistical variation, which makes interpreting movements between years 
extremely difficult.  Due to the relatively small sample size, it is possible that modest 
changes in median Hispanic family income in a certain region are due to sampling issues, 
not real changes in Hispanic well-being. 
 
Table 5: 
Forecasts of Median Hispanic Family Income Based on Past Recessions, By Region 
  
 
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
2004 
% Change 
from 2000 
to 2004 
Northeast  
1980s-Style Recession  $     30,243  $     30,876   $     25,303   $     25,499   $     27,862  -7.9%  
1990s-Style Recession  $     30,243  $     30,173   $     29,884   $     28,121   $     28,446  -5.9% 
Midwest  
 1980s-Style Recession  $     37,839  $     38,757   $     38,947   $     36,276   $     36,983  -2.3% 
 1990s-Style Recession  $     37,839  $     36,854   $     34,916   $     36,452   $     41,076  8.6% 
South  
1980s-Style Recession  $     33,584  $     34,231   $     32,957   $     33,832   $     33,840  0.8%  
1990s-Style Recession  $     33,584  $     33,814   $     30,963   $     31,841   $     31,380  -6.6% 
West  
1980s-Style Recession  $     33,824  $     34,784   $     33,039   $     32,397   $     35,294  4.3%  
1990s-Style Recession  $     33,824  $     32,440   $     33,096   $     31,712   $     30,624  -9.5% 
Note: Numbers in italics are forecasts 
 
Hispanic Poverty Rate 
 
 While the Hispanic poverty rate remains nearly twice as high as the overall 
poverty rate, the decline in the Hispanic poverty rate was a bright spot of the 1990s 
economic expansion; Hispanic poverty reached its lowest level since data were first 
collected in 1972.   
 
 Many analysts believe that the best anti-poverty program is a job, and during the 
late 1990s, jobs for Hispanic workers were plentiful.  But the labor market has substantial 
slack now, and will likely continue to weaken through next year.  Such labor market 
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weakening tends to cause Hispanic poverty to rise: our analysis of the relationship 
between Hispanic poverty and overall unemployment suggest that each percentage point 
rise in the national unemployment rate causes the Hispanic poverty rate to increase by an 
average of 1.2 percentage points.   
 
 Some economists argue that the poverty rates of minority groups, such as 
Hispanics, have become even more sensitive to changes in the unemployment because of 
a weakening of the social safety net.  Richard Freeman, an economics professor at 
Harvard University, recently said, “I think we will see a rise in the poverty rate.  And I 
think it will be bigger than an historically expected increase, because we have undone a 
lot of the welfare underpinnings.”22 
 
Figure 6: Forecasts of Hispanic Poverty 
Based on Blue Chip Economic Forecasts
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 Based on the average Blue Chip Economic forecast, Hispanic poverty will rise 
from 21.2 percent in 2000 to 23.2 percent in 2002, and then will fall to 22.4 percent in 
2004.  See Figure 6.  The optimistic and pessimistic Blue Chip forecasts provide a range 
for these estimates: in 2002, Hispanic poverty could reach as high as 23.9 percent or as 
                                                 
22 Christopher Farrell, “A Gossamer-Thin Safety Net,” Business Week, November 19, 2001, page 30. 
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low as 22.6 percent.  Even under the average of the optimistic forecasts, Hispanic poverty 
does not reach its 2000 level by 2004.  
 
 The forecasts based on the Blue Chip Economic forecasts are relatively similar to 
the forecasts based on past recessions (especially the 1980s and 1990s recessions).  If 
Hispanic poverty were to follow the path of the 1980s recession, it would rise to just over 
24 percent in 2002 before falling to 23.4 in 2004; if it were to follow the path of the 
1990s recession, the Hispanic poverty rate would increase slowly from its current 21.2 
percent level to 23.2 percent in 2004.23  If the current downturn mimics the 1970s 
recession, though, Hispanic poverty may increase substantially – rising to more than 26 
percent in 2002 – before dropping sharply.     
 
Figure 7: Forecasts of Hispanic Poverty 
Based on Past Recessions
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 A similar analysis of what future economic conditions could mean to poverty 
among Hispanic children also suggests that Hispanic child poverty will increase 
somewhat in the next two years.  If we use the Blue Chip Economic forecasts to predict 
                                                 
23 It is important to note that during the 1990s recession the Hispanic poverty rate did not return to its pre-
recession level until 1998.  For comparison, the white poverty rate returned to its pre-recession level three 
years earlier (in 1995).   
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Hispanic child poverty, the estimate suggests that Hispanic child poverty will rise from 
28.0 percent in 2000 to just over 29.3 percent in 2002 (with a range from 28.8 percent to 
29.8 percent).  For comparison, if the trend of Hispanic child poverty follows its trend 
during the 1980s and 1990s, it could increase to as high as 33.3 percent in 2002 before 
retreating (based on the 1980s recession) or increase gradually to 30.3 percent in 2004 
(based on the 1990s recession). 
  
III. How Well Prepared Are Hispanics for the Economic Downturn 
 
 The previous section examined how Hispanics may fare during the current 
economic recession.  The purpose of this section is to explore how well prepared 
Hispanics are for these tougher economic conditions.   
 
Personal Savings and Wealth Among Hispanics 
 
 When the economy weakens, many families will need to draw down existing 
savings to pay for consumption.  But if a family’s savings are small, or even non-existent, 
the economic downturn can quickly turn making ends meet from a challenge into a crisis.  
For example, the Bureau of the Census reported that only 26 percent of Hispanics 
reported receiving interest income from savings in 2000, compared to 55 percent of their 
white counterparts.  In addition, among those families that have savings, Hispanics 
received significantly less interest income, on average: $870 for Hispanics versus $1,946 
for whites.24 
 
Data from a different government survey – the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) – provides additional insight into the personal savings and 
assets of Hispanic families.  See Table 6.  In 1998, the median net worth of Hispanic 
families was $9,720, which represents just 14 percent of the median net worth for all 
families.  For comparison, the median net worth of African-American families was 
$15,500 in 1998.  The financial position of Hispanic families excluding debts and non-
                                                 
24 See Bureau of the Census, March Current Population Survey, available at http://www.census.gov 
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financial assets such as homes, cars, and business interests is even weaker: the median 
financial assets of Hispanic families in 1998 was $1,200, or seven percent of the median 
financial assets for all families ($17,320) and 39 percent of the median financial assets of 
African-American families ($3,060).25  But many financial assets, such as retirement 
savings, may be unavailable to families during the current economic downturn.  Data 
from the SCF suggest that the typical Hispanic family has just $600 in liquid financial 
assets.26  (The mean financial position is somewhat better, but still significantly below the 
average for all families.)  In addition, few Hispanic families were taking steps to 
strengthen their finances: in 1998, just 29.5 percent of Hispanic families had positive 
savings. 
 
To provide a sense of how much Hispanic families need in savings, it is 
instructive to examine spending patterns.  According to data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), the typical Hispanic family spent 
$21,660 in 1998 – or $1,805 per month.  In 1998, the typical family did not earn enough 
after taxes to support that level of spending; after-tax income, according to data from the 
CEX, was $19,780 for the typical Hispanic family.  Thus, even during good economic 
times, Hispanic families were going into debt.  That raises a substantial concern about 
what will happen if the income stream were to dry up.  Most likely, many families would 
cut back on spending and begin to draw down their savings.  If the median family were 
able to cut its spending in half, it would have less than three weeks of liquid reserves to 
draw upon in checking and savings accounts and less than six weeks of financial assets.   
 
Thus, the combination of rising layoffs, lower incomes, and a low level of savings 
portends an extremely precarious situation for many Hispanic families during the current 
economic downturn.  In the absence of sufficient private savings, such families may need 
                                                 
25 Financial assets include checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, call accounts at 
brokerages, CDs, stocks, bonds, mutual fund assets, IRAs, savings bonds, the cash value of life insurance, 
401(k)s, other managed assets (such as annuities with equity interest and trusts), and other financial assets 
(such as royalties, non-public stocks, etc.). 
26 Liquid financial assets include only checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, and 
call accounts at brokerages. 
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to rely upon the social safety net to support minimal levels of consumption during an 
economic downturn. 
 
 
Table 6: Net Worth, Financial Assets, Liquid Assets, and Savings 
Among Hispanic Families, 1998 
  
 
Hispanics 
 
 
Overall 
Hispanics as 
Share 
of Overall 
All Families 
Median Net Worth $        9,720 $      71,700 13.6% 
Mean Net Worth $       86,895 $     282,980 30.7% 
 
Median Financial Assets $        1,200 $      17,320 6.9% 
Mean Financial Assets $       32,656 $     134,271 24.3% 
 
Median Liquid Assets $           600 $        2,500 24.0% 
Mean Liquid Assets $        8,239 $      15,242 54.1% 
 
Percent Saving in 1998 29.5% 41.7% 70.7% 
 
 
Families With Children Under 18 
Median Net Worth $        8,800 $      47,450 18.5% 
Mean Net Worth $       94,141 $     233,841 40.3% 
 
Median Financial Assets $           800 $      13,000 6.2% 
Mean Financial Assets $       31,268 $     302,096 10.4% 
 
Median Liquid Assets $           400 $        2,000 20.0% 
Mean Liquid Assets $        6,646 $      11,187 59.4% 
 
 
Percent Saving in 1998 27.6% 36.4% 75.8% 
Source: Author’s calculations of Survey of Consumer Finance, various years. 
 
 
The Social Safety Net 
 
 The social safety net functions as a cushion to dampen the blow from an 
economic downturn.  A key component of the social safety net periods of high 
unemployment is unemployment insurance, but other programs – such as food stamps, 
welfare, and job training initiatives – also play an important role in helping families stay 
on their feet during a difficult period.  This section briefly explores the role these 
programs play in helping workers through severe economic times. 
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Unemployment Insurance 
 
 Unemployment insurance (UI) provides eligible workers income support when 
they have been laid off due to no fault of their own and are able, available, and looking 
for work.  While benefit levels are determined by each state, they generally represent 40 
to 50 percent of previous wages.  That is, if a worker earned $500 per week, UI generally 
“replaces” $200 to $250 of that amount.  Such benefits are provided for up to 26 weeks. 
 
 UI plays an important role in helping families make ends meet.  A paper by 
Jonathan Gruber, an economics professor at MIT, found that a family’s spending on food 
would fall by 22 percent, on average, if the head of the household became unemployed in 
the absence of UI, but by only 7 percent in the presence of UI.27 
 
 Unfortunately, many Hispanic workers will not receive unemployment insurance 
benefits: only about 40 percent of all unemployed workers receive UI benefits.  The 40 
percent recipiency rate represents three factors: not all eligible unemployed workers 
apply for benefits; many workers are ineligible for benefits because of their past work 
records; and unemployed workers who are unable to actively search for full-time work 
are ineligible for benefits in most states. 
 
 Academic evidence suggests that minorities are somewhat less likely to apply for 
UI benefits than whites.  For example, Blank and Card (1991) used two data sets and a 
number of different statistical techniques to analyze the differential take-up rates of 
minorities and whites.  Using data from the early 1980s, they found that non-whites were 
three to six percent less likely than whites to apply for UI benefits, but the difference was 
not always statistically significant.  Using Current Population Survey data, Blank and 
Card found small, statistically insignificant negative effects on minority status on UI 
take-up rates.   
 
                                                 
27 See Gruber (1997). 
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 In October 2001, eleven percent of unemployed Hispanics – or 127,000 people – 
had been out-of-work for 27 weeks or more; for the above-mentioned reasons, some of 
these workers may not have received UI benefits.28  The workers who are eligible and 
received UI could benefit from an extension of UI benefits.  Moreover, in 31 states, 
people who are looking for part-time work are ineligible for unemployment benefits.  In 
many cases, employees cannot work full-time hours because they have to take care of a 
child or a parent.  Even though part-time workers pay UI taxes, they cannot receive 
benefits in most states (if they are looking for part-time work).29  Proposals to extend UI 
benefits to workers seeking part-time work, therefore, could be beneficial to Hispanics.  
 
Other Social Safety Net Programs 
 
Besides unemployment insurance, a number of other Federal and state programs 
fill out the social safety net.  These programs include: 
 
• Food stamps. The food stamp program provides nutritional benefits to working 
and non-working poor families.  In March 2001, 17.3 million people – most of 
whom are children – benefited from food stamps.30 Each family’s benefit depends 
on the size of the household, the family’s gross income, and the family’s expenses 
(e.g., housing costs) that significantly impact the family’s ability to purchase a 
nutritionally adequate diet.  The maximum food stamp benefit for a family of four 
is $434 per month; the average benefit, however, during the first six months of 
Fiscal Year 2001 was less than $75 per person per month.  A study by the United 
States Department of Agriculture examined why families applied for food stamps.  
For the roughly four-fifths of applicants that they could determine why they 
applied, about 75 percent had recently suffered a sharp drop in earnings, had 
exhausted his or her 26 weeks of unemployment insurance, or the primary wage 
earner had departed the household.  Thus, if the Hispanic unemployment rate rises 
                                                 
28 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey. 
29 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1.9 million Hispanics worked part-time in October 2001. 
30 David Super, “Background on the Food Stamp Program,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 
10, 2001. 
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as forecasted in Section III, food stamps will play an important role in bolstering a 
family’s standard of living.   
 
• Job training programs.  Another important part of the social safety net is the 
variety of job training programs available to unemployed workers.  These 
programs, in particular the Department of Labor’s dislocated worker program and 
trade adjustment assistance program (which provides job training and income 
support to workers who lost their jobs due to an increase in imported goods), are 
critical in an economic downturn.  The research that has been conducted on these 
job training programs shows that they are effective at helping people get a good 
job when they are targeted at experienced workers and training of marketable 
skills is provided.31  Since Hispanic workers are more likely to become 
unemployed than other workers, these job training programs may be particularly 
essential in helping Hispanics who lose their jobs in one sector get retrained for 
skills to get a job in another sector.   
 
• Other initiatives.  For Hispanic families with children, they could potentially 
benefit from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  In 
addition, since most health care coverage is employer provided, when workers 
lose their job, they often lose health care coverage for their family.  COBRA 
health care benefits allow workers to “buy back in” to their former health care 
plan.  But two in five Hispanics of worker age do not have health care insurance 
and would thus be ineligible for COBRA.32  And for those that could buy back 
into COBRA health coverage, many Hispanics cannot afford it. 
 
                                                 
31 See United States Department of Labor (1995). 
32 Friedrich (2001). 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
 In both absolute and relative terms, Hispanics are (a) more likely to feel the 
negative impact of the current economic recession and (b) less prepared for the adverse 
consequences of the downturn.   
 
 Based on the extant forecasts for the U.S. economy, we project that Hispanic 
unemployment will likely rise to roughly 8.5 percent (from 7.6 percent in November 
2001 and 5.7 percent in 2000).  However, those forecasts may be unduly optimistic given 
the uncertainties surrounding the war on terrorism and the economic slowdown, and the 
experience from past recessions suggests that the increase in Hispanic unemployment 
could be even greater – to over 10 percent.   
 
 In addition, the Hispanic unemployment rate may not bounce back as rapidly as 
other groups following the recession.  For example, during the early part of the expansion 
following the 1990s recession, Hispanic unemployment did not fall as quickly as the 
white or African-American unemployment rates.  The white and African-American 
unemployment rates returned to roughly their pre-1990s recession level by the beginning 
of 1995.  The Hispanic unemployment rate did not fall to its pre-1990s recession level 
until December 1996.  If Hispanic unemployment were to follow that path during the 
current economic slowdown, the Hispanic unemployment rate would not fall below 6.4 
percent (its level in September 2001) until March 2008; for comparison, the white and 
African-American unemployment rates would return to roughly their pre-recession levels 
by early 2006. 
 
 Hispanic family income is likely to fall by between $1,000 and $3,000, and 
Hispanic poverty is expected to rise from its current level of 21.2 percent to 23 percent or 
24 percent.  It is important to note that median Hispanic family income was especially 
sluggish during the 1990s: it did not return to its pre-recession level until 1999.  If the 
income of the median Hispanic family were to follow such a path during the current 
decade, it would not rise above its 2000 level until 2010.  For comparison, the median 
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income of African-American families rebounded to its 1989 level by 1994, and the 
median income of white families returned to its pre-1990 recession level by 1996.  It is 
thus clear that Hispanic workers and families will likely feel the brunt of the economic 
downturn.   
 
 But of particular concern is that Hispanic families are not well prepared for the 
current economic downturn.  In 1998, the median financial assets of Hispanic families in 
1998 was $1,200, or seven percent of the median financial assets for all families 
($17,320) and 39 percent of the median financial assets of African-American families 
($3,060).  But many financial assets, such as retirement savings, may be unavailable to 
families during the current economic downturn.  Our analysis suggests that the typical 
Hispanic family will have roughly $600 in liquid financial assets to help weather the 
current economic storm.  In addition, unemployment insurance – while effective at 
blunting the impact of the recession – is unlikely to be as helpful to Hispanics as other 
workers.   
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